Garner v. Tennessee Case

A slip of paper in which the court ruled that a Tennessee fleeing felon integrity was un fundamental beca affair it legalize the part of at peace(predicate)ly specialty by legal philosophy when a peculiar poses no immediate nemesis to the jurisprudence or others. The court ruled that the utilise of unwholesome promote was a twenty-five percent Amendment gaining control issue subject to a conclusion of reasonableness. Father, whose unarm son was shot by police military officer as son was fleeing from the burglary of an unoccupied house, brought wrongful death action under the federal civil right statute against the police officer who fired the shot, the police department and others. The United States District accost for the Western District of Tennessee, raise W. Wellford, J. , after remand, rendered judgement for harborant, and father appealed. The Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit, and remanded. writ of certiorari was granted.The Supreme Court held that ap prehension by use of evil durability is a ecstasy subject to the one-quarter Amendments reasonableness unavoidableness sulphurous specialty may non be used unless it is inevitable to preserve the escape and the officer has potential cause to hope that the wary poses a signifi backsidet threat of death or serious forcible damage to the officer or others Tennessee statute under authority of which police officer fired fatal shot was unconstitutional because it authorized use of deadly wildness against apparently unarmed, non dangerous fleeing mirthful the fact that unarmed rummy had broken into a dwelling at night did non automatic in ally mean that he was dangerous. At some 1045 p. m.on October 3, 1974, Memphis Police Officers Elton Hymon and Leslie Wright were dispatched to answer a prowler inside call.The fleeing suspect, who was appellee-respondents decedent, Edward realise, stopped at a 6-feet-high chain link fence at the edge of he yard. With the aid of a flas hlight, Hymon was able to see realises face and hands. He saw no sign of weapon, and, though not certain, was reasonably sure and figured that clear was unarmed, He cerebration get was 17 or 18 years of age and about 55 or 57 tall. While Garner was crouched at the fence, Hymon called out Police and took a few steps toward him. Garner then began to climb everywhere the fence. Convinced that if Garner made it over the fence he would ran away, Hymon shot him.The bullet hit Garner in the back of the head. Garner was taken to a hospital, where he was pronounce dead on the operating table. Ten dollars and a purse taken from the house were found on his body. In apply deadly chock up to hinder the escape , Hymon was acting under the authority of a Tennessee statute and consistent to Police Department policy. The statute provides that if, after notice of the intention to amaze the defendant, he either flee, or forcibly resist, the officer may use all necessary pith to affect the arrest. The District Court reason that Hymons action were authorized by the Tennessee statute, which in turn was constitutional.Hymon had use the save reasonable and practicable means of preventing Garners escape. Garner had recklessly and unmindfully attempted to jump over the fence to escape, thereby assuming the responsibility to be risk of being fired upon. The Court of Appeals for Six Circuit affirmed with regard to Hymon, finding that he had acted in good-faith according to the Tennessee statute and was therefore within the scope of his qualified immunity. It remanded for rethink of the possible liability of the city, however. Justice White then delivered the opinion of the by saying This exercise requires us to determine the constitutionality of the use of deadly root for to prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed suspected felon.We conclude that such(prenominal) effectiveness may not be used unless it is deemed necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has apparent cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the killing of a fleeing suspect is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and is therefore constitutional only if reasonable. The Tennessee statute failed as applied to this case because it did not adequately marge the use of deadly force by distinguishing between felonies of different magnitudes. The facts as found, did not furtherify the use of deadly force under the Fourth Amendment.Officer cannot resort to deadly force unless they have probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a felony and poses a threat to the safety of the officers or a danger to the community if left on the loose. The State of Tennessee, which had intervened to defend the statute, appealed to this court. The city filed for petition for certiorari. Whenever an officer restrain the freedom of a soulfulness to walk away, he has s eized that person. While it is not always clear just when minimal police interference become a seizure, there can be no question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.A police officer may arrest a person if he has probable cause to believe that person committed a crime. suppliant and appellant argued that if this requirement is satisfied, the Fourth Amendment has nothing to say about how that seizure is made. This submission ignores the more cases in which this Court, by balancing the intent of the infringement against the need for it, has examined the reasonableness of the manner in which a search or seizure is conducted. To determine the constitutionality of a seizure we must balance the reputation and quality of the intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment vex against the importance of the government interest alleged to relinquish the intrusion.Because one of the factors is the exten t of the intrusion, it is plain that reasonableness depends on not only when a seizure is made, but also how it is carried out. Notwithstanding probable cause to seize a suspect, an officer may not always do so by killing him. The intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is unmatched. The suspect s fundamental interest in his avouch life need not be elaborated upon. The use of deadly force also frustrate the interest of the individual, and of society, in judicial intention of guilt and punishment. Against these interests are ranged governmental interest in effective righteousness enforcement. It is argued that overall violence will be reduced by back up the peaceful submission of suspects who know that they may be shot if they flee.Effectiveness in making arrest requires the resort to deadly force, or at least(prenominal) the meaningful threat thereof. Being able to arrest such individuals is a condition precedent to the states entire system of law enforcement. With out in both way disparaging the importance of these goals, we are not such convinced that the use of deadly force is sufficiently amentaceous means of accomplishing them of justify the killing of nonviolent suspects. The use of deadly force is a self-defeating way of apprehending threat of deadly force efficacy be thought to lead to the arrest of more live suspects by discouraging escape attempts, the presently available evidence vigor not support this thesis.The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspect, whatever the circumstances, is unconstitutionally unreasonable. It is no better that all felony suspects die than that they escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the vituperate resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so. It is no doubt when a suspect who is in military post escapes, but the fact that the police arrive a little easy or are a little slowe r afoot doe not always justify killing the suspect. A police officer may not seize an unarmed, non dangerous suspect by injure him dead. The Tennessee statute in unconstitutional because as it authorizes the use of deadly force against such fleeing suspects.It is not, however, unconstitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon of there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the annoyance or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if where feasible, some exemplar has been given. As applied in such circumstances, the Tennessee statute would pass constitutional muster. We do not deny the practical difficulties of attempting to assess the suspects dangerousness. However, similarly difficult judgement must be made by the police in equally uncertain circumstances.Nor is there any peculiarity that the States th at allow the use of deadly force only against dangerous suspects, the standard has been difficult to apply os has led to a rash of judicial proceeding involving inappropriate second-guessing of police officers split-second decisions. Moreover, the highly technical felony or misdemeanor distinction is equally, if not more, difficult to apply in the field. And officer is no position to know, for example, the precise value of property stolen, or whether the crime was a source or second offense. Finally, as noted above, this claim must be viewed with suspicion in light of the similar self-im comprise limitations of so many police department.The District Court concluded that Hymon was justified in dead reckoning Garner because state law allows, and the Federal Constitution does not forestall the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of a fleeing felony suspect if no alternative means of apprehension is available. This conclusion made a determination of Garners apparent dangerous ness unnecessary. The court did find, however, that Garner appeared to be unarmed, though Hymon could not be certain that was the case. Restated in Fourth Amendment terms, this means Hymon had no articulable basis to think Garner was armed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals certain the District Courts factual conclusions and held that the facts, as found, did not justify the use of deadly force. Officer Hymon could not reasonably believed that Garner comprise any threat.Indeed, Hymon never attempted to justify his action on any basis other than the need to prevent an escape. Hymon did not have probable cause to believe that Garner, whom he correctly believed to be unarmed posed any physical danger to himself or others. The judgement of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceeding consistent with this opinion. As stated in the impression paper, in the killing of Miriam Carey by Washington DC Police. The Tennessee v. Garner case can be used as precedent in justifying the use of deadly force while she was fleeing. Where he reckless driving in attempt to flee the scene can be consider as immediate threat to the police officers and the others.